We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer...

We confront a representative sample of one 1,102 Dutch individuals with a series of incentivized investment decisions and also elicit their time preferences. There are two treatments that differ in the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer...

We confront a representative sample of one 1,102 Dutch individuals with a series of incentivized investment decisions and also elicit their time preferences. There are two treatments that differ in the frequency at which individuals decide about the invested amount. The low frequency treatment...

This paper presents the results of an experimental study on unemployment benefit sanctions. The experimental set-up allows us to distinguish between the effect of benefit sanctions once they are imposed (the ex post effect) and the effect that unemployed want to avoid getting a benefit sanction...

We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of different types of active labor market policies (ALMP). In our empirical analysis we use data on 20 OECD countries covering the time period 1985-1999. We find that labor market training is the most effective program to bring down unemployment....

We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also...

This paper presents a theory and an empirical investigation on cyclical fluctuations in workplace accidents. The theory is based on the idea that reporting an accident dents the reputation of a worker and raises the probability that he is fired. Therefore a country with a high or an increasing...

This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...

Putting a limit on the duration of unemployment benefits tends to introduce a spike in the job finding rate shortly before benefits are exhausted. Current theories explain this spike from workers' behavior. We present a theoretical model in which also the nature of the job matters....