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Can endogenous group formation prevent coordination failure? A theoretical and experimental investigation

Raab, Philippe - 2005

This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with … more groups within which they want to play the coordination game. In the theoretical part we show that a simple myopic best … reply dynamics under endogenous group formation leads to the payoff dominant outcome in both types of coordination games …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267615

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams in experimental normal-form games

Sutter, Matthias; Czermak, Simon; Feri, Francesco - 2010

We present an experiment on strategic thinking and behavior of individuals and teams in one-shot normal-form games …. Besides making choices, decision makers have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269696

Strategic sophistication of adolescents: Evidence from experimental normal-form games

Czermak, Simon; Feri, Francesco; Rützler, Daniela; … - 2010

We examine the strategic sophistication of adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, in experimental normal-form games. Besides making choices, subjects have to state their first- and second-order beliefs. We find that choices are more often a best reply to beliefs if any player has a dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272677

Can Endogenous Group Formation Prevent Coordination Failure? A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation

Raab, Philippe - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761696

Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L. - 2022

Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games. In this paper, we leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on average when they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013351814

Using Response Times to Measure Strategic Complexity and the Value of Thinking in Games

Gill, David; Prowse, Victoria L. - 2017

Response times are a simple low-cost indicator of the process of reasoning in strategic games (Rubinstein, 2007; Rubinstein, 2016). We leverage the dynamic nature of response-time data from repeated strategic interactions to measure the strategic complexity of a situation by how long people think on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011653246

Career Concerns in a Simple Experimental Labour Market

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Sliwka, Dirk - 2003

We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261580

Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases

Oechssler, Jörg; Roider, Andreas; Schmitz, Patrick W. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

We use a simple, three-item test for cognitive abilities to investigate whether established behavioral biases that play a prominent role in behavioral economics and finance are related to cognitive abilities. We find that higher test scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick (2005)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762419

Gender differences in risk aversion: Do single-sex environments affect their development?

Booth, Alison; Sosa, Lina Cardona; Nolen, Patrick - 2011

economically important ways. To test this, we designed a controlled experiment using first year college students who made choices …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282545

Beliefs, Learning, and Personality in the Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav - 2022

We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (IRPD). To do so, we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find that heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426341