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Building political collusion: Evidence from procurement auctions
Coviello, Decio; Gagliarducci, Stefano - 2010
We investigate the relationship between the time politicians stay in office and the functioning of public procurement. To this purpose, we collect a data set on the Italian municipal governments and all the procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005. Identification is achieved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269756
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Building Political Collusion: Evidence from Procurement Auctions
Coviello, Decio; Gagliarducci, Stefano - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
We investigate the relationship between the time politicians stay in office and the functioning of public procurement. To this purpose, we collect a data set on the Italian municipal governments and all the procurement auctions they administered between 2000 and 2005. Identification is achieved...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506079
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Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation
Kräkel, Matthias - 2018
The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011816561
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Risk, Delegation, and Project Scope
Roider, Andreas - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007
exogenous risk and delegation. That is, we show that only if exogenous risk is sufficiently large, the risk-neutral principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005703275
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - 2010
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269520
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Testing canonical tournament theory: On the impact of risk, social preferences and utility structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282234
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Gift Exchange in the Workplace: Money or Attention?
Dur, Robert - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008
We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822723
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert; Non, Arjan; Roelfsema, Hein - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008506073
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory: On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M.; Wu, Steven Y. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646321
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Subjective Evaluations: Discretionary Bonuses and Feedback Credibility
Fuchs, William - 2013
We provide a new rationale for the use of discretionary bonuses. In a setting with unknown match qualities between a worker and a firm and subjective evaluations by the principal, bonuses are useful in order to make the feedback from the firm to the workers credible. This way workers in good...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329084