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Financing entrepreneurship and the old-boy network

Inci, Eren; Parker, Simon C. - 2012

We study entrepreneurs' start-up financing from banks and local financiers. An informal network, whose membership … cannot be observed by outsiders, conveys the good signals it gets about the hidden types of network entrepreneurs to local … absence of a network. Thus, the formation of the network is inefficient as entrepreneurs incur networking costs for purely …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282600

Employer Learning and Schooling-Related Statistical Discrimination in Britain

Galindo-Rueda, Fernando - 2003

This paper develops and tests a new model of asymmetric information in the labour market involving employer learning. In the model, I provide theoretical conditions for the identification – based on the experience and tenure profiles of estimated returns to ability and education – of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262759

Negative externalities and equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection

von Siemens, Ferdinand; Kosfeld, Michael - 2009

Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities between agents - an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type attracted by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276700

Asymmetric information in the labor market, immigrants and contract menu

Kar, Saibal; Saha, Bibhas Chandra - 2011

Immigrant workers and their labor force participation in host countries have received critical attention in all concerned disciplines, principally owing to its strong implications for well-being of natives. The ageing population in many rich countries and several related and unrelated issues...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278687

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Roider, Andreas; Muehlheusser, Gerd - 2004

In this paper we analyze the frequently observed phenomenon that (i) some members of a team ("black sheep") exhibit behavior disliked by other (honest) team members, who (ii) nevertheless refrain from reporting such misbehavior to the authorities (they set up a "wall of silence"). Much cited...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261919

The Role of Regulation and Regional Government Quality for High Growth Firms: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

Amoroso, Sara; Herrmann, Benedikt; Kritikos, Alexander S. - 2023

blocks to develop tailored policy measures that may influence the development of HGFs in a region. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014469596

Division of labour and directed production

Ratto, Marisa; Schnedler, Wendelin - 2005

We examine a situation where efforts on different tasks positively affect production but are not separately verifiable and where the manager (principal) and the worker (agent) have different ideas about how production should be carried out: agents prefer a less efficient way of production. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267331

Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various tasks is often identified with a trade-off between the responsiveness (sensitivity, precision, signal-noise ratio) of the performance measure and its similarity (congruity,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268002

The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - 2009

determinants for efficiency in credence goods markets. While theory predicts that either liability or verifiability yields …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271236

Worker self-selection and the profits from cooperation

Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2008

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276699