Similar Search Results

Base salaries, bonus payments, and work absence among managers in a German company

Pfeifer, Christian - 2012

Questions about compensation structures and incentive effects of pay-for-performance components are important for firms' Human Resource Management as well as for economics in general and labor economics in particular. This paper provides scarce insider econometric evidence on the structure and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291414

Do Co-Workers? Wages Matter? : Theory and Evidence on Wage Secrecy, Wage Compression and Effort

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter - 2004

We study worker and firm behavior in an environment where worker effort could depend on co-workers? wages …. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers? ?concerns? with coworkers? wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to compress … wages under quite general conditions. However, firms should be harmed by such concerns, and such concerns can justify paying …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262158

Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experiment

Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - 2006

from fixed wages to performance pay based on the average productivity of lower-tier workers. Theory suggests that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267490

Social connections and incentives in the workplace: evidence from personnel data

Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - 2008

engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages, to bonuses based on the average productivity of the … workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269058

Managerial incentives and favoritism in promotion decisions: Theory and field evidence

Berger, Johannes; Herbertz, Claus; Sliwka, Dirk - 2011

This paper investigates the effects of managerial incentives on favoritism in promotion decisions. First, we theoretically show that favoritism leads to a lower quality of promotion decisions and in turn lower efforts. But the effect can be mitigated by pay-for-performance incentives for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278492

Can higher bonuses lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams

Klor, Esteban F.; Kube, Sebastian; Winter, Eyal; … - 2011

Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278589

Design and implementation of pay for performance

Gibbs, Michael - 2012

A large, mature and robust economic literature on pay for performance now exists, which provides a useful framework for thinking about pay for performance systems. I use the lessons of the literature to discuss how to design and implement pay for performance in practice.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282426

Team structure and the effectiveness of collective performance pay

Ratto, Marisa; Tominey, Emma; Vergé, Thibaud - 2012

The adoption of performance related pay schemes has become increasingly popular in the public sector of several countries. In the UK, the scheme designers favoured collective performance pay with the aim to foster cooperation across offices. The resulting team structure included several offices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010287638

Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay : An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting

Villeval, Marie-Claire; Eriksson, Tor - 2004

concentration of high skill workers in performance pay firms; (iii) however, in repeated interactions, efficiency wages coupled with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940

Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments

Eriksson, Tor; Teyssier, Sabrina; Villeval, Marie-Claire - 2006

When exogenously imposed, rank-order tournaments have incentive properties but their overall efficiency is reduced by a high variance in performance (Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt 1987). However, since the efficiency of performance-related pay is attributable both to its incentive effect and to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267611