by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the … empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should … garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct field experiments to test which sealed bid format, first price, second …

investigate several puzzles from the recent auctions literature. Our results suggest that: (1) the reputation of an artist and the … provenance of the artwork, omitted variables in most previous studies, seem to be more important determinants of the sale price … in predicting whether or not an artwork sells at auction, (3) there is little supporting evidence for the widespread …

bid on prices, but also received points for three proxies of the quality of their services: their reputation, a … scoring weights of the quality items result in higher price bids, particularly of WTW-firms that are bidding for the first … time as entrants. For the WTW-firms that won the procurements, we find a higher weight for both the reputation and the …

by the first price auction. Our design also allows us to identify differential participation as the source of the … empirically, about the properties of charity auctions. The small theoretical literature suggests that the all-pay auction should … garner more money than winner-pay auctions. We conduct field experiments to test which sealed bid format, first price, second …

that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an …

Netherlands. First we estimate structural discrete-choice models for labour supply. Next we simulate key past reforms and compare …