Showing 1 - 10 of 531
This paper experimentally examines how religious festivals and the degree of religiosity affect cooperation and altruistic punishment by using public goods experiments. We conducted the experiments in Turkey at different points in time; one on the most religious day during Ramadan (the Night of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282506
It is unlikely that husbands and wives always agree on exactly what public goods to buy. Nor do they necessarily agree on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative setting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277211
, including those where institutions govern only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267731
experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another …. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262760
This paper studies the effect of endogenous group formation on the outcome in two types of coordination games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria. Endogenous group formation means that in each period players are free to choose among two or more groups within which they want to play the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267615
Existing experimental research on behavior in weakest-link games shows overwhelmingly the inability of people to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium, especially in larger groups. We hypothesize that people are able to coordinate on efficient outcomes, provided they have sufficient freedom to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282539
Because costly punishment is not credible, subgame perfection suggests that punishment will not deter free riding, regardless of the size or structure of groups. However, experiments show that people will punish free riders, even at considerable cost. To examine the implications of agents who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262078
We consider a two-person Cournot game of voluntary contributions to a public good with identical individual preferences, and examine equilibrium aggregate welfare under a separable, symmetric and concave social welfare function. Assuming the public good is pure, Itaya, de Meza and Myles (Econ....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269097
We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269308