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implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of … competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010269521
Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users …. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can … therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377343
Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users …. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can … therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884234
implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust … control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of … competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543256
We analyze the offering, asking, and granting of help or other benefits as a three-stage game with bilateral private information between a person in need of help and a potential help-giver. Asking entails the risk of rejection, which can be painful: since unawareness of the need can no longer be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013426425
We experimentally investigate a simple version of Holmström?s career concerns model in which firms compete for agents in two consecutive periods. Profits of firms are determined by agents? unknown ability and the effort they choose. Before making second-period wage offers firms are informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261580
The impact of transparency on the extent of reciprocal behavior is investigated in a simple repeated gift exchange experiment, where principals set wages and agents respond by choosing effort levels. In addition to the efforts the principals? payoffs are determined by a random component. It is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261601
Holmström?s (1982/99) career concerns model has become an important workhorse for the analysis of agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way – which may or may not reasonably approximate real-life decision makers?...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262147
this task. We show, that those announced beliefs lead to a self fulfilling prophecy as the reputation of the responsible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262163
Free riding in team production arises because individual effort is not perfectly observable. It seems natural to suppose that greater transparency would enhance incentives. Therefore, it is puzzling that team production often lacks transparency about individual contributions despite negligible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267330