In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

We model entry by entrepreneurs into new markets in developing economies with regulatory barriers in the form of licence fees and bureaucratic delay. Because laissez faire leads to 'excessive' entry, a licence fee can increase welfare by discouraging entry. However, in the presence of a licence...

In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political...

Dynamic panel data methods are used to estimate a growth model using data from 23 transition countries for the period 1990 to 2003. The estimating equation is augmented with country- and time-specific variables for methods of privatization and other factors potentially relevant to growth in...

We develop entrepreneurship and institutional theory to explain variation in different types ofentrepreneurship across individuals and institutional contexts. Our framework generateshypotheses about the negative impact of higher levels of corruption, weaker property rightsand especially...

We analyze theoretically and empirically the impact of the shadow economy onentrepreneurial entry, utilising 1998-2005 individual-level Global Entrepreneurship Monitordata merged with macro level variables. A simple correlation coefficient suggests a positivelinear link between the size of the...

We explore the country-specific institutional characteristics likely to influence an individual’sdecision to become an entrepreneur. We focus on the size of the government, on freedomfrom corruption, and on ‘market freedom’ defined as a cluster of variables related toprotection of property...

The transition economies have lower rates of entrepreneurship than are observed in mostdeveloped and developing market economies. The difference is even more marked in thecountries of the former Soviet Union than those of Central and Eastern Europe. We link thesedifferences partly with the...

In this paper we explore the relationship between the individual decision to become anentrepreneur and the institutional context. We pinpoint the critical roles of property rights andthe size of the state sector for entrepreneurial activity and test the relationships empirically bycombining...