We introduce "lack-of-recall" of past transactions as an alternative assumption to anonymity in a model where trade is centralized. In environments where there is an intertemporal lack-of-double-coincidence of wants problem and lack-of-commitment, lack-of-recall can give rise to monetary...

We analyze bureaucracy and corruption in a market with decentralized exchange and "lemons." Exchange is modeled as a sequence of bilateral, random matches. Agents have private information about the quality of goods they produce and can supplement trade with socially inefficient bribes....

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as a medium of exchange. We investigate optimal bank behavior and the resulting provision of liquidity under a range of central bank regulations. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves, facing...

A model is developed that employs recent developments in the literature on search models of money to capture the distributional effects of monetary policy in a tractable way. Deterministic and stochastic versions of the model are studied. Money is not neutral, and these nonneutralities persist,...

An example is constructed to illustrate some points about the Berentsen-Camera-Waller article, followed by some comments. Copyright 2005 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.