This paper considers generalized Lorenz-maximal solutions in the core of a convex TU-game and demonstrates that such solutions satisfy coalitional monotonicity and population monotonicity.

We explore the relationship between proportionality and manipulation (via merging or splitting agents' claims) in bankruptcy problems. We provide an alternative proof to the well-known result that, in an unrestricted domain, immunity to manipulation is equivalent to requiring proportional...

In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2005), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained...

In this paper, we study the immunity of bankruptcy rules to manipulation via merging or splitting agents' claims. We focus on the TAL-family of bankruptcy rules (Moreno-Ternero & Villar, 2006), a one-parameter family encompassing three classical rules: the Talmud (T) rule, the constrained...