Individuals are randomly matched to play a <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$2\times 2$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> <mo>×</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> coordination game where the Pareto efficient and risk dominant equilibria differ. Players choose strategies by imitating the strategy of the most successful individual they observe. So, while individuals interact globally,...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

The Aumann (In: Gabszewicz JJ, Richard JF, Wolsey L (eds) Economic decision making: games, econometrics and optimisation, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1990</CitationRef>) conjecture states that cheap-talk messages do not necessarily help to coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria. In an experimental test of Aumann’s conjecture,...</citationref>

A population of players repeatedly plays an n strategy symmetric game. Players update their strategies by sampling the behavior of k opponents and playing a best response to the distribution of strategies in the sample. Suppose the game possesses a ${1 \over k}$-dominant strategy which is...

We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to...

This paper considers two-player quadratic games to examine the relation between strategic interactions in actions and in information decisions. We analyze the role of external effects and of the relative intensities with which the players’ actions interact with the uncertain payoff-relevant...

In a correlated equilibrium, the players’ choice of actions is directed by correlated random messages received from an outside source, or mechanism. These messages allow for more equilibrium outcomes than without any messages (pure-strategy equilibrium) or with statistically independent ones...