In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy...

We show that the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game is a Lipschitz continuous function of the players’ common prior belief with respect to the total variation metric on beliefs. This is unlike the case of general Bayesian games where lower semi-continuity of Bayesian equilibrium (BE) payoffs...

We investigate quasi-values of finite games - solution concepts that satisfy the axioms of Shapley (1953) with the possible exception of symmetry. <p> Following Owen (1972), we define "random arrival'', or path, values: players are assumed to "enter'' the game randomly, according to independently...</p>

Mirman and Tauman (1982) show that axioms of cost sharing, additivity, rescaling invariance, monotonicity, and consistency uniquely determine a price rule on the class of continuously differentiable cost problems as the Aumann-Shapley price mechanism. Here we prove that standard versions of...