This paper provides existence results for a large class of covertly collusive outcomes in oligopoly markets. In particular, the paper shows that the Alpha-core is non-empty in linear industries with any asymmetric costs and any asymmetric capacity bounds (JEL C62, C71, D43, L13).

A specific structure is added to the model of Bayesian society, and the associated (more involved) version of the Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium concept is proposed. The equilibrium endogenously explains whether or not player j in coalition S, in pursuit of his self-interest,...

This paper provides a TU -core existence result in a large class of normal form games. In the oligopoly markets of a homogeneous good, the TU -core is non-empty if all profit functions are continuous and concave. In a general game, the existence of TU -core follows from the weak separability,...