Minimum cost spanning tree problems connect agents efficiently to a source with the cost of using an edge fixed. We revisit the dispute between the Kar and folk solutions, two solution concepts to divide the common cost of connection based on the Shapley value. We introduce a property called...

We will find 3 maximal subclasses with respect to essential, superadditive and convex games, respectively such that a game is in one subclass, so are its reduced games.

In many applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems, such as river-, polluted river- and sequencing games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some ordering on the set of the players. A totally positive game has a nonempty...

We provide an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value in TU games as the unique maximizer of expected Nash welfare. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1988</CitationRef>) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2001</CitationRef>) on a large space of non-differentiable games....</citationref></citationref>