Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability is assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility...