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This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>
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Convex cooperative games were first introduced by Shapley (Int J Game Theory 1:11–26, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">1971</CitationRef>) while population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS) were subsequently proposed by Sprumont (Games Econ Behav 2:378–394, <CitationRef CitationID="CR13">1990</CitationRef>). In this paper we provide several characterizations of convex games and...</citationref></citationref>
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In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...
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In this paper we characterize convex games by means of Owen's multilinear extension and the marginal worth vectors associated with even or odd permutations. Therefore we have obtained a refinement of the classic theorem; Shapley (1971), Ichiishi (1981) in order to characterize the convexity of a...
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