We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges...

Following “Barberà et al. (<CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1991</CitationRef>, Econometrica 59:595–609)”, we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable...</citationref>

We give a characterization of the equilibrium payoffs of a dynamic game, which is a stochastic game where the transition function is either one or zero and players can only use pure actions in each stage. The characterization is in terms of convex combinations of connected stationary strategies;...

We consider the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma with lexicographic complexity costs, where transitional complexity between states is included as one aspect of overall strategic complexity. We prove that a full folk theorem obtains in presence of any level of perfection of the equilibrium...