Previous ultimatum bargaining experiments have shown that bargainers face the conflict whether to exploit bargaining power or to comply with basic norms of distributive justice. In multiperiod ultimatum bargaining for an increasing cake, trust in fairness can enable cooperation and thus more...

Reciprocal behavior means that recipients of harm respond in kind, that is by harming the other. We try to explain why such a behavior may be rational, although the damage cannot be prevented anymore. Our main approach is the one of evolutionary stability, i.e., we will show that mutants...

Absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall, in which a single history includes more than one decision node in an information set. Put differently, players, after making a decision, sometimes face it again without recalling having ‘been there before’. Piccione and Rubinstein (Game...

The Aumann (In: Gabszewicz JJ, Richard JF, Wolsey L (eds) Economic decision making: games, econometrics and optimisation, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1990</CitationRef>) conjecture states that cheap-talk messages do not necessarily help to coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria. In an experimental test of Aumann’s conjecture,...</citationref>