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The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. <p>We show that on the class of...</p>
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In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also...
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In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes...
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A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, called routing game, is associated with this allocation problem, and an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375697
Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>
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We prove that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is in general NP-hard. The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598406
We consider classes of cooperative games. We show that we can efficiently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and the least core of the game if we can efficiently compute the minimum excess for any given allocation. In the case where the prekernel of the game contains...
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