We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We...

We introduce the concept of -consistent equilibrium where each player plays a -best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an -consistent equilibrium induces an -equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of -consistent...

Every two person repeated game of symmetric incomplete information, in which the signals sent at each stage to both players are identical and generated by a state and moves dependent probability distribution on a given finite alphabet, has an equilibrium payoff.

In the framework of dynamic programming we provide two results: (1) An example where uniform convergence of the "T"-stage value does not imply equality of the limit and the lower infinite value. (2) Generalized Tauberian theorems, that relate uniform convergence of the "T"-stage value to uniform...

Given an information structure a function that measures how the inferences made by the agents spread among the states is defined; it specifies for each event its impact at each state, for each agent. Several properties are established.

Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or "player." One is interested not only in each person's knowledge and beliefs about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge and beliefs about the others' knowledge and beliefs....

Formal Interactive Epistemology deals with the logic of knowledge and belief when there is more than one agent or "player." One is interested not only in each person's knowledge about substantive matters, but also in his knowledge about the others' knowledge. This paper examines two parallel...