The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...

In Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn and Tijs (1992) the compromise value is introduced as a solution concept on the class of compromise admissible NTU-games. Two characterizations of the compromise value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games. This note shows that in one of these...

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. <p> There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be...</p>

This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>