We present a simplified model of the evolution of a society which is regulated by a formal unanimity voting procedure. We examine several protocols, which depend on whether admission or expulsion are permissible, and on the order with which they are implemented. Conditions which ensure the...

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the...

The reactive bargaining set (Granot [1994]) is the set of outcomes for which no justified objection exists. Here, in a justified objection the objector first watches how the target tries to act (if he has such an option), and then reacts by making a profit and ruining the target's attempt to...

In this paper we consider a generalization of the minimum cost spanning tree game. The generalized model allows for more than one supplier, where each supplier offers a different type of service to the customers and each customer specifies a non-empty subset of these suppliers to which he wishes...

A repairman makes a round-trip along a set of customers. He starts in his home location, visits each customer exactly once, and returns home. The cost of his trip has to be shared by the customers. A cooperative cost game, called routing game, is associated with this allocation problem, and an...

Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varepsilon $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ε</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

We prove that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is in general NP-hard. The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems.

We consider classes of cooperative games. We show that we can efficiently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and the least core of the game if we can efficiently compute the minimum excess for any given allocation. In the case where the prekernel of the game contains...