Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. <p> There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be...</p>

This article considers single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games that satisfy core selection and aggregate monotonicity, defined either on the set of all games, G <Superscript> N </Superscript>, or on the set of essential games, E <Superscript> N </Superscript> (those with a non-empty imputation set). The main result is that...</superscript></superscript>

In this paper conditions are given guaranteeing that the Core equals the D-core (the set of unDominated imputations). Under these conditions, we prove the non-emptiness of the intersection of the Weber set with the imputation set. This intersection has a special stability property: it is...

We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE....

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...