We study finite zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of their opponent. Rather, at each stage, each player observes a stochastic signal that may depend on the current state and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume that each player observes the...

Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback is established for a simple class nonzero-sum differential games on the line. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

We introduce the dual of a stochastic game with incomplete information on one side, and we deduce some properties of optimal strategies of the uninformed player.

We construct a non-zero sum game on the square, with separately continuous payoff functions, and which has no correlated equilibrium. This answers a recent question of Nowak.

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are...

We offer a new representation for the space of conditional systems on a finite set. We prove its equivalence with the usual representations, and use it to give short proofs of several known results.