We prove that computing the nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games is in general NP-hard. The proof uses a reduction from minimum cover problems.

We consider classes of cooperative games. We show that we can efficiently compute an allocation in the intersection of the prekernel and the least core of the game if we can efficiently compute the minimum excess for any given allocation. In the case where the prekernel of the game contains...

Let $N=\{ 1,...,n\} $ be a finite set of players and $K_{N}$ the complete graph on the node set $N\cup \{ 0\} $. Assume that the edges of $K_{N}$ have nonnegative weights and associate with each coalition $S\subseteq N$ of players as cost $c(S)$ the weight of a minimal spanning tree on the node...

An axiomatization of the interaction between the players of any coalition is given. It is based on three axioms: linearity, dummy and symmetry. These interaction indices extend the Banzhaf and Shapley values when using in addition two equivalent recursive axioms. Lastly, we give an expression of...