An important open problem in the theory of TU-games is to determine whether a game has a stable core (Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (1944)). This seems to be a rather difficult combinatorial problem. There are many sufficient conditions for core-stability. Convexity is probably the best known...

For a collection of subsets of a finite set N we define its core to be equal to the polyhedral cone {x∈IRN: ∑i∈N xi=0 and ∑i∈Sxi\geq0 for all S∈}. This note describes several applications of this concept in the field of cooperative game theory. Especially collections are considered...

According to Maschler, Peleg and Shapley (1972) the bargaining set of a convex game coincides with its core and the kernel consists of the nucleolus only. In this paper we prove the same properties for [Gamma]-component additive games (= graph restricted games in the sense of Owen (1986)) if...

We prove that the core on the set of all transferable utility games with players contained in a universe of at least five members can be axiomatized by the zero inessential game property, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, boundedness, the weak reduced game property, the converse...

We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, by sidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called the...

A solution on a class of TU games that satisfies the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the equal treatment property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus (NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). We investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the...