Showing 1 - 8 of 8
We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension ${\overline {v}}$ on the space B1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension ${\overline {v}}$ is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155726
In a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information, we show equivalence between the following characteristics of a bidder: (i) having a dominant strategy; (ii) possessing superior information; (iii) being immune from winner's curse. When a dominant strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375620
We investigate the equivalence between several notions of bargaining sets which occur in the literature and the core of simple games.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375640
We show that the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game is a Lipschitz continuous function of the players’ common prior belief with respect to the total variation metric on beliefs. This is unlike the case of general Bayesian games where lower semi-continuity of Bayesian equilibrium (BE) payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993396
Greenberg (1990) and Ray (1989) showed that in coalitional games with a finite set of players the core consists of those and only those payoffs that cannot be dominated using payoffs in the core of a subgame. We extend the definition of the dominance relation to coalitional games with an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755717
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755735
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755645
We study the Fictitious Play process with bounded and unbounded recall in pure coordination games for which failing to coordinate yields a payoff of zero for both players. It is shown that every Fictitious Play player with bounded recall may fail to coordinate against his own type. On the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755693