Showing 1 - 5 of 5
The process of computing the nucleolus of arbitrary transferable utility games is notoriously hard. A number of papers have appeared in which the nucleolus is computed by an algorithm in which either one or a huge number of huge linear programs have to be solved. <p>We show that on the class of...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375571
In a paper in 1975, Dubey characterized the Shapley-Shubik index axiomatically on the class of monotonic simple games. In 1979, Dubey and Shapley characterized the Banzhaf index in a similar way. This paper extends these characterizations to axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155754
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155723
In this paper we define the Lorenz stable set, a subset of the core consisting of the allocations that are not Lorenz dominated by any other allocation of the core. We introduce the leximin stable allocation, which is derived from the application of the Rawlsian criterion on the core. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178886
Young’s theorem implies that every core concept violates monotonicity. In this paper, we investigate when such a violation of monotonicity by a given core concept is justified. We introduce a new monotonicity property for core concepts. We pose several open questions for this new property. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010680550