While in previous models of pre-play communication players are forced to communicate, we investigate what happens if players can choose not to participate in this cheap talk. Outcomes are predicted by analyzing evolutionary stability in a population of a priori identical players. If the game...

We consider the "and" communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are...

We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments à la Blackwell. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

This paper proves a Folk Theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. To obtain this result, we first show a similar property for finitely repeated games with terminal payoffs.

This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple fitness comparisons in the spirit of the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) by Taylor and Jonker (1978). It compares these with the set-valued notions of Thomas (1985d) and...