We study alternative methods of assigning scarce resources to individuals who may be liquidity-constrained. Selling the resources via auctions is increasingly popular, but that method may produce an inefficient allocation when agents are liquidity constrained. A simple non-market scheme such as...

We study an inside patent holder's optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival. The patent holder can choose any two-part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. We demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a...

Self-financing has often been seen as an important source for research-and-development (R&D) funding. However, an in-depth comparison between the determinants of self-financing in the case of traditional investments versus those in R&D has not been provided yet. We use a comprehensive data set...

In two-sided markets where platforms are constrained to set non-negative prices, tying can be deployed by platforms as a tool to introduce implicit subsidies. For a monopoly, this raises participation and benefits consumers on both sides. In a duopoly, tying on one side makes a platform more or...

By analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochastically between low and high states and where firms follow a price-matching punishment strategy, we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close. This...

Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001) contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms. The formula is incorrect. We derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications...

We analyze competition in product lines by multi-product oligopolists that have preferential access to a local market but can supply a rival's market by incurring distance costs. We show that the width and degree of overlap in the product lines is greater in large markets and when the products...

We consider a two-period model with two sellers and one buyer. Although we assume it is efficient for the buyer to purchase from both sellers in each period, we show that when the buyer's valuations are inter-temporally linked and at least one seller is financially constrained, exclusion can...

We analyze investment incentives for a firm A owning a software platform and an application and a firm B deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform. While B's entry helps the success of the platform, B fears ex post expropriation by A and is hence reluctant to enter and...

We evaluate the impact on market power and efficiency of a series of mergers on three Portuguese non-life insurance markets. We specify and estimate, with a panel of firm-level data, a structural model which includes: preferences, technology, and a market equilibrium condition. Firms' demand...