We reconsider the question of the optimal level of termination fees between communication networks in the context of heterogeneous usage and elastic participation. The interaction between these two features yields new insights; in our model: i) The profit maximizing reciprocal termination fee is...

The paper explores the role of price or quantity leadership in facilitating collusion. It extends the standard analysis of tacit collusion by allowing firms to make their strategic choices either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that price leadership indeed facilitates collusion by...

The paper presents recent advances in the analysis of successive oligopolies characterized by "interlocking relationships", where competing upstream suppliers deal with the same set of competing downstream partners. We first highlight the extent to which interlocking relationships alter...

We examine the impact of the licensing policies of one or more upstream owners of essential intellectual property (IP hereafter) on the variety offered by a downstream industry, as well as on consumers and social welfare. When an upstream IP monopoly increases the number of licenses, it enhances...