Showing 1 - 10 of 78
Subjective performance evaluation is widely used by firms and governments to provide work incentives. However, delegating evaluation power to local leadership could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to impressing/pleasing their evaluator, relative to working...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013462670
the internal organization of the U.S. federal bureaucracy over 1817-1905. First, we show a series of facts, describing how …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014337824
Governments in developing countries have low fiscal capacity yet face pressures to provide public goods and services, leading them to rely on various unusual fiscal arrangements. We document one such - hitherto unexplored - arrangement: informal fiscal systems that rely on local bureaucrats to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014421219
. In this paper, we study the possibility that quality of bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470984
Recent work in the sociology of economic development has emphasized the establishment of a professional government … bureaucracy in place of political appointees as an important component of the institutional environment in which private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473683
The current paper presents a method of deciding the question of whether any given stage in the budget process is an example of the "political" or the "bureaucratic" model. We then use it to study local government spending on education. The basis for our method is the important difference between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012478928
We argue that China, with its long history, a relatively stable political system, and multiple regime changes, provides us an opportunity to investigate the political economy of administrative hierarchy. Using prefecture-level panel data and exploiting regime changes during AD1000-2000, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479176
We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479257
We formally model the impact of presidential policymaking on the willingness of bureaucrats to exert effort and stay in the government. In the model, centralized policy initiative by the president demotivates policy-oriented bureaucrats and can impel them to quit rather than implicate themselves...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012481901
We examine the correlation between gender and bureaucratic corruption using two distinct datasets, one from Italy and a second from China. In each case, we find that women are far less likely to be investigated for corruption than men. In our Italian data, female procurement officials are 34...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482615