We analyze how the size of a cartel affects the possibility to sustain a collusive agreement. We develop a multi-period oligopoly model with homogeneous, quantity-setting firms, a subset of which are assumed to collude, while the remaining (fringe) firms choose their output levels...

We consider a duopoly model of spatial competition in which the owners of the firms can strategically use two variables: the duration of managerial incentive contracts and the location of the firms. In equilibrium, one owner chooses a long-term incentive contract for his manager (becoming a...

Aunque la duración del contrato de auditoría ha atraído recientemente gran atención en la literatura, sobre todo, por sus posibles efectos sobre la calidad de la auditoría, la investigación no ha aportado hasta el momento una respuesta concluyente sobre esta cuestión. Este trabajo analiza...

This paper presents an unnoticed result that may occur when an effective minimum quality standard is imposed in a duopoly model where firms decide on quality and prices in two stages and where both covered or uncovered markets may be endogenous outcomes of the competition game. We derive...

El análisis del equilibrio en precios en mercados con producto diferenciado ha mostrado un progreso notable. Este trabajo revisa la evolución y el estado de la cuestión en esta área. Se describen los principales resultados en la estimación de la demanda derivados de la teoría de elección...

We explore the implications of the differential behavior of total factor productivity across sectors for understanding the dynamics of the relative prices of services and manufactures. We find that, in the second half of the nineties, contrary to the assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson...

We consider the interactions between innovation and merger policy under different assumptions on technology transfer. In the absence of licencing, we show that in some cases the government must commit to a permissive policy to ensure that socially desirable innovations take place, while in other...

This paper examines welfare changes before the introduction of more competition in technologically related markets. We develop a simple two-market duopoly with product differentiation where a multi-product firm competes with a different single-product firm in each market. Two competition...

We consider an industry where one of the manufacturers and its supplier (S) have engaged in some specific investment in the past. We assume that this has three consequences: S has lower expected production costs than other suppliers, supplier-switching costs exist, and the manufacturer may limit...

We examine the minutes of the executive committees of two Basque firms in the iron and steel industry, Altos Hornos de Bilbao and Vizcaya, to discuss the relevance of di􀀞erent factors on the survival and failure of the collusive agreements reached in the industry from 1886 to 1901. We observe...