In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, unbiasedness, and the efficiency of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze a large panel of individual forecasts that has not been analyzed in the literature so far. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all G7...

In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, unbiasedness, and the efficiency of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze a large panel of individual forecasts that has not been analyzed in the literature so far. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all G7...

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. The relevance of one person's words is assessed by assigning exogenously the role of the communicator to one group member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the...

One-way communication has been found to substantially increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.

In this paper, we study a voluntary contribution mechanism with one-way communication. The relevance of one person's words is assessed by assigning exogenously the role of the "communicator" to one group member. Contrary to the view that the mutual exchange of promises is necessary for the...

We investigate leading by example in a public goods game in scenarios with and without intergroup competition. Leading by example is implemented via a sequential decision protocol. We examine both one-shot and repeated interaction and make use of the strategy method to characterize followers'...

Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) have shown that one-way communication enhances contributions to public goods. We investigate the effectiveness of one-way communication, when the benefits from the public good are asymmetric and the sender of a message is the main beneficiary of cooperation. Our...

One-way communication has been found to substantially increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.