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In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369309
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884477
two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281623
two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671388
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266677
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severity of the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. When this principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentives to abide by it crucially depends on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090601
One-way communication has been found to substantially increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286472
One-way communication has been found to substantially increase contributions in linear voluntary contribution mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008773568
We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects’ reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others’ choices, and how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866530
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866575