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What drives motivated agents? : the "right" mission or sharing it with the principal

Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2015

Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176

Hidden costs of control : three repetitions and an extension

Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - 2010

We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943978

Productivity in contests : organizational culture and personality effects

Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - 2010

importance of a "triple-fit" of preferences, organizational culture and incentive mechanism. -- Tournaments ; Organizational …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003989034

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2012

The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515366

Strategic communication : an experimental investigation

Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014

In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission. In particular we focus on the models by Crawford & Sobel (1982), Lai (2010) and Ehses-Friedrich (2011). These three models differ in the information that the receiver...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010260085

Generosity, greed and gambling : what difference does asymmetric information in bargaining make?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2009

We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the information condition, proposer generosity increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003824174

Fragility of information cascades : an experimental study using elicited beliefs

Koessler, Frédéric; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Bracht, Juergen - 2008

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in laboratory experiments. One group of low informed subjects make predictions in sequence. In a matched pairs design, another set of high informed subjects observe the decisions of the first group and make predictions....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003803102

Committing to incentives : should the decision to sanction be revealed or hidden?

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin - 2010

Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178

Tournaments and piece rates revisited : a theoretical and experimental study of premium incentives

Güth, Werner; Levínský, René; Pull, Kerstin; Weisel, Ori - 2010

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research … focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we …-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980512