Based on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...

We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH,...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory experiments. This tool has been primarily designed to be used in combination with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), but it should work in combination with other experimental softwares which help developing and...

E-nstructions facilitates the use of electronic instructions in computerized laboratory experiments in social sciences. In this article I provide a set of guidelines for the installation and the use of E-nstructions. -- Experiments ; Experimental software ; Instructions

This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2 X 2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly...

We report the results of an original experiment that was designed to test the strength and robustness of the attraction effect. Rather than the usual simple tests for this effect, we consider a conceptually simple consumer purchasing task where alternatives are however difficult to evaluate. For...

Empirically, social dilemma under information asymmetry are often much less pronounced than theory predicts. Traders experience a winner's curse and maintain efficiency enhancing exchange of commodities when theory predicts none. Especially under competition, cursed parties undergo severe losses...

An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...

We investigate whether experimental participants follow their private information and contradict herds in situations where it is empirically optimal to do so. We consider two sequences of players, an observed and an unobserved sequence. Observed players sequentially predict which of two options...

Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisonerś Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a...