’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for …

projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism remains …

. -- Allocation ; auction ; fair division ; externalities ; experiment …

corresponding common value auction. Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games, behavior … the fair division game separates into extreme overand underbidding. -- common value auction ; winner’s curse ; fair …

seems to rationally optimise against a population where some members use markdown bids and some are rational. -- Auction … ; experiment ; overbidding ; underbidding ; risk-aversion. …