This paper introduces a dynamic Bayesian game with an unknown population distribution. Players do not know the true population distribution and assess it based on their private observations using Bayes׳ rule. First, we show the existence and characterization of an equilibrium in which each...

In this paper we study an oligopoly market where profit-maximizing firms and socially concerned firms compete in quantities. Confronting remarks by Milton Friedman and Gary Becker, we are using an evolutionary setting to investigate the endogenous choice of the proper objective of business firms...

In a forward-looking business cycle model, central banks can achieve the (timeless)optimal commitment equilibrium even in the absence of a commitment technology, if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. The paper develops a general...

We propose a behavioural model of technological change with evolutionary switching between costly innovators and free imitators, and study the endogenous interplay of innovation decisions, market price dynamics and technological progress. Innovation and imitation are strategic substitutes and...

This paper investigates firms׳ optimal location choices explicitly accounting for the role of inwards and outwards knowledge spillovers in a dynamic Cournot oligopoly with firms that are heterogeneous in their ability to carry out cost-reducing R&D. Firms can either locate in an industrial...

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market-clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated....

A player׳s knowledge of her own actions and the corresponding payoffs may enable her to infer or form beliefs about what the payoffs would have been if she had played differently. For quantitative learning models employed in studies of low information environments, players׳ ex-post inferences...

This paper considers the evolutionary dynamics of a free trade agreement (FTA) network formation game among N countries. We first explore the static model introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006) and precisely characterize the set of pairwise stable FTA networks. Then, we develop a dynamic model...

This paper analyzes an evolutionary version of the Public Good game in which boundedly rational agents can use imitation and best-reply decision rules. Several possibilities for both decision rules to be present in the population are considered. I show that altruistic behavior might survive if...