Showing 1 - 10 of 10
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159407
In this paper we examine the effects of default and collateral on risk sharing. We assume that there is a large set of assets which all promise a risk less payoff but which distinguish themselves by their collateral requirements. In equilibrium agents default, the assets have different payoffs,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042948
This paper develops a method to compute the equilibrium correspondence for exchange economies with semi-algebraic preferences. Given a class of semi-algebraic exchange economies parameterized by individual endowments and possibly other exogenous variables such as preference parameters or asset...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005153787
In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic OLG economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009194573
We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507144
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005159320
We introduce the concept of a TUU-game, a transferable utility game with uncertainty. In a TUU-game there is uncertainty regarding the payoffs of coalitions. One out of a finite number of states of nature materializes and conditional on the state, the players are involved in a particular...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318588
We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860914
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005117618