We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the...

We propose a new concept for the analysis of games, the TASP, which gives a precise prediction about non-equilibrium play in games whose Nash equilibria are mixed and are unstable under fictitious play-like learning. We show that, when players learn using weighted stochastic fictitious play and...

We consider a discrete choice model in which the payoffs to each of an agentʼs n actions are subjected to the average of m i.i.d. shocks, and use tools from large deviations theory to characterize the rate of decay of the probability of choosing a given suboptimal action as m approaches...

We offer a parsimonious definition of large population potential games, provide some alternate characterizations, and demonstrate the advantages of the new definition over the existing definition, but also show the equivalence of the two definitions.