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Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 191-212

A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043051

Equivalence of the information structure with unawareness to the logic of awareness

Heinsalu, Sander - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 6, pp. 2453-2468

This paper proves the Li (2009) [13] unawareness structure equivalent to the single-agent propositionally generated … approaches suggests they capture a natural notion of unawareness in a minimal way. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042968

The value of information under unawareness

Galanis, Spyros - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 384-396

The value of information is examined in a single-agent environment with unawareness. Although the agent has a correct … prior about events he is aware of and has a clear understanding of his available actions and payoffs, his unawareness may … negative, contrasting what is true in the standard model with partitional information and no unawareness. We show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263576

A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content

Ghosh, Arpita; Hummel, Patrick - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 349-374

We investigate the widely-used rank-order mechanism for displaying user-generated content, where contributions are displayed on a webpage in decreasing order of their ratings, in a game-theoretic model where strategic contributors benefit from attention and have a cost to quality. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076680

Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs

Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio - In: Journal of Economic Theory 156 (2015) C, pp. 77-102

We study mechanism design in non-Bayesian settings of incomplete information, when the designer has no information about the players, and the players have arbitrary, heterogeneous, first-order, and possibilistic beliefs about their opponents' payoff types.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189740

Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information

Liu, Qingmin - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 49-75

This paper provides an explicit characterization of correlations that are implicitly captured by partition models for incomplete information games. The main result of this paper shows that every partition model for incomplete information can be decomposed into the conjunctions of a unique...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263604

Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents

Sandholm, William H. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 2056-2071

We consider models of stochastic evolution in two-strategy games in which agents employ imitative decision rules. We introduce committed agents: for each strategy, we suppose that there is at least one agent who plays that strategy without fail. We show that unlike the standard imitative model,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594317

Dynamic legislative policy making

Duggan, John; Kalandrakis, Tasos - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 5, pp. 1653-1688

We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo for the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities, and we assume...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010594322

Gambling in contests

Seel, Christian; Strack, Philipp - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2033-2048

This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702849

Restricted feedback in long term relationships

Doraszelski, Ulrich; Escobar, Juan F. - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 142-161

This paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history, as may be the case in online markets. Our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582584