In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d), where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d) is a...

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of objective...