We are interested in the comparisons of standard-of-living across societies when observations of both income and household structure are available. We generalise the approach of A.B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon (1987) [3] to the case where the marginal distributions of needs can vary across the...

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

We provide foundations for robust normative evaluation of distributions of two attributes, one of which is cardinally measurable and transferable between individuals and the other is ordinal and non-transferable. The result that we establish takes the form of an analogue to the standard...

We propose a multivariate extension of Yaariʼs dual theory of choice under risk. We show that a decision maker with a preference relation on multidimensional prospects that preserves first order stochastic dominance and satisfies comonotonic independence behaves as if evaluating prospects using...

Few papers in the literature on inequality measurement deal with uncertainty, particularly when the ranking of cohorts may not be fixed. We present a set of axioms implying such a class of inequality measures under uncertainty that is a one-parameter extension of the generalized Gini mean over...

Orderings of interdependence are useful in many economic contexts: in assessing ex post inequality under uncertainty; in comparing multidimensional inequality; in valuing portfolios of assets or insurance policies; and in assessing systemic risk. We explore five orderings of interdependence for...

The objective of this paper is to derive some integer-majorization results for variable-sum comparisons. We use an axiomatic framework to establish equivalence between several intuitively reasonable conditions.

This introduces the symposium on inequality and risk.

I propose a game-theoretic model of costly voting that predicts significant turnout rates even when the electorate is arbitrarily large. The model has two key features that jointly drive the result: (i) some agents are altruistic (or ethical), (ii) among the agents who prefer any given...