How do markets for debt cash flow rights, with and without accompanying control rights, affect the efficiency of lending? A bank makes a loan, learns if it needs monitoring, and then decides whether to lay off credit risk. The bank can transfer credit risk by either selling the loan or buying a...

We consider a dynamic limit order market in which traders optimally choose whether to acquire information about the asset and the type of order to submit. We numerically solve for the equilibrium and demonstrate that the market is a "volatility multiplier": prices are more volatile than the...

We consider firms that, all else equal, wish to minimize variability in their internal capital (due to convex costs of raising external funds). The firms can hedge the cash flow risk of the project, but not that of winning or losing the auction. We characterize optimal hedging and bidding...

We analyze how entrepreneurial firms choose between two funding institution: banks, which monitor less intensively and face liquidity demands from their own investors, and venture capitalists, who can monitor more intensively but face a higher cost of capital because of the liquidity constraints...