Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Abstract We consider multiple-type housing markets. To capture the dynamic aspect of trade in such markets, we study a dynamic recontracting process similar to the one introduced by Serrano and Volij (2008). First, we analyze the set of recurrent classes of this process as a (non-empty) solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870879
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005374288
We consider collective decision problems given by a profile of single-peaked preferences defined over the real line and a set of pure public facilities to be located on the line. In this context, Bochet and Gordon (2012) provide a large class of priority rules based on efficiency,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065474
A social choice correspondence (SCC) is virtually implementable if it is [var epsilon]-close (in the probability simplex) to some (exactly) implementable correspondence [Abreu, D., Sen, A., 1991. Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica 59, 997-1021] proved that, without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008521744
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf's (1974) [Shapley, L., Scarf's, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23-37.] model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-called multiple-type housing markets. We show that the prominent solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005388396
In the context of resource allocation on the basis of priorities, Ergin (2002) identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the priority structure such that the student-optimal stable mechanism satisfies a consistency principle. Ergin (2002) formulates consistency as a local property based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011065421
We consider several notions of setwise stability for many-to-many matching markets with contracts and provide an analysis of the relations between the resulting sets of stable allocations for general, substitutable, and strongly substitutable preferences. Apart from obtaining "set inclusion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077714
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870897
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005216783