We consider a standard optimal taxation framework in which consumers' preferences are separable in consumption and labor and identical over consumption, but are affected by consumption externalities. For every nonlinear, income-dependent pricing of goods there is a linear pricing scheme,...

How much health should we have and how should it be distributed? This paper studies how to define social objectives for the allocation of health and income in a setting where individuals may differ in their preferences about health and consumption, earning ability, and health disposition. It is...

We study the construction of a social ordering function for the case of a public good financed by contributions from the population. We extend the analysis of <link rid="b2">Maniquet and Sprumont (2004)</link> to the case when cost shares cannot be negative, i.e., agents cannot receive subsidies from others. We adapt...

In a model where agents have unequal wages and heterogeneous preferences, we study the optimal redistribution via an income tax, when the social objective is based on a combination of efficiency and fairness principles, and when incentive issues are taken into account. We show how some fairness...