This paper studies an investment policy which improves the ability of team members to decide correctly. We specify sufficient conditions on the learning function such that the best policy of investment in human capital is to invest first in the least competent person. Despite the fact that team...

Government intervention often gives rise to contests in which the possible "prizes" are determined by the status quo and some new public policy proposal. In this paper we study a general class of such two-player public policy contests and examine the effect of a change in the proposed policy, a...

In the two-stage political-economic game that we study public policy is the outcome of the interaction between interest groups and a two-tier government. Implementation of a policy proposed by a bureaucrat requires approval by an elected politician. The objective function of the bureaucrat...

This paper focuses on indivisible "multiple-cost-single-benefit " projects that must be approved by the government. A simple mechanism is proposed that ensures an efficient and fair implementation of such projects. The proposed mechanism is appropriate for a unilateral information structure: the...