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Polarized platforms and moderate policies with checks and balances

Alesina, Alberto; Rosenthal, Howard - In: Journal of Public Economics 75 (2000) 1, pp. 1-20

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005306325

Asymmetric information and agenda control : The bases of monopoly power in public spending

Filimon, Radu; Romer, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard - In: Journal of Public Economics 17 (1982) 1, pp. 51-70

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389133

Private incentives in social dilemmas : The effects of incomplete information and altruism

Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rosenthal, Howard - In: Journal of Public Economics 35 (1988) 3, pp. 309-332

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389403

The elusive median voter

Romer, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard - In: Journal of Public Economics 12 (1979) 2, pp. 143-170

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005306631

Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis

Palfrey, Thomas R.; Rosenthal, Howard - In: Journal of Public Economics 24 (1984) 2, pp. 171-193

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005183924

Economic incentives and political institutions: Spending and voting in school budget referenda

Romer, Thomas; Rosenthal, Howard; Munley, Vincent G. - In: Journal of Public Economics 49 (1992) 1, pp. 1-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005324054

Openness, country size and government

Alesina, Alberto; Wacziarg, Romain - In: Journal of Public Economics 69 (1998) 3, pp. 305-321

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389171

An overlapping generations model of electoral competition

Alesina, Alberto; Spear, Stephen E. - In: Journal of Public Economics 37 (1988) 3, pp. 359-379

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389492

War, peace, and the size of countries

Alesina, Alberto; Spolaore, Enrico - In: Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005) 7, pp. 1333-1354

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005389515

Regulation versus taxation

Alesina, Alberto; Passarelli, Francesco - In: Journal of Public Economics 110 (2014) C, pp. 147-156

We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744247